Coup d'état

Lore & Background

The phrase coup d'état is of relatively recent coinage, though the concept has featured in politics since antiquity. In the British press, the phrase came to be used to describe various murders by Napoleon's alleged secret police. Most coup attempts occurred in the mid-1960s, but there were also large numbers in the mid-1970s and the early 1990s. Coups occurring in the post-Cold War period have been more likely to result in democratic systems than Cold War coups, though coups still mostly perpetuate authoritarianism. The number of successful coups has decreased over time. Failed coups in authoritarian systems are likely to strengthen the power of the authoritarian ruler. The cumulative number of coups is a strong predictor of future coups, a phenomenon referred to as the 'coup trap'. Related terms include self-coup, soft coup (illegal overthrow without force), palace coup (faction within ruling group displaces another), putsch (minority reactionary coup), pronunciamiento (formal declaration deposing government), and cuartelazo (barracks revolt). Regimes that came to power with revolutions face coups at a much higher rate.

Reader's Guide

The coup d'état is a central concept in political history, representing a recurring method of power transfer outside legal channels. Coups have been most common in Africa and the Americas, and least common in Europe. The phenomenon of the 'coup trap' indicates that past coups predict future ones. Coup-proofing strategies, such as placing loyal family or ethnic groups in the military, can reduce military effectiveness. The term's etymology from French and its early use in English journalism highlight its modern coinage despite ancient practice. The variety of related terms—self-coup, soft coup, palace coup, putsch, pronunciamiento, cuartelazo—reflects the different forms and contexts of such seizures of power. Understanding coups is essential for analyzing political instability, authoritarian resilience, and the conditions under which democracies may emerge or fail.

Did You Know?

• The term coup d'état comes from French, literally meaning a 'stroke of state' or 'blow of state'.
• Most coup attempts occurred in the mid-1960s, with additional peaks in the mid-1970s and early 1990s.
• The cumulative number of coups is a strong predictor of future coups, a phenomenon called the 'coup trap'.

The Architecture of a Junior Officers' Revolt

The 1960 Turkish coup was not a top-down military operation but a conspiracy hatched by thirty-eight junior officers who deliberately operated outside the established chain of command. Until the eve of the action, the group functioned under the de facto leadership of Cemal Madanoğlu. The plan nearly collapsed when Colonel Ragıp Gümüşpala threatened to intervene against the coup unless a senior general assumed command. The officers resolved this by elevating General Cemal Gürsel to their nominal head, a move that gave the operation the institutional weight it lacked. The backdrop was one of economic strain: American financial support flowing through the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan was dwindling, and Prime Minister Adnan Menderes had been planning a diplomatic trip to Moscow to secure alternative credit lines. This convergence of fiscal pressure and political instability created the conditions in which a small cadre of young officers believed they could seize the levers of state power.

The Radio Address and the Junta's Internal Fracture

At 3:00 am on 27 May 1960, Colonel Alparslan Türkeş took to the airwaves to announce that the armed forces had assumed control across the entire country. His broadcast declared the operation completed without a single casualty and imposed a nationwide curfew, urging citizens to cooperate with the military in reestablishing the nationally desired democratic regime. The following day, General Cemal Gürsel told reporters that the coup's sole objective was to restore a fair, clean, and solid democracy and return governance to the people's free choice. Yet beneath this rhetoric, a deep ideological rift was already forming. A younger faction orbiting Türkeş favored prolonged military rule modeled on the Committee of Union and Progress or Atatürk's early regime. Their attempt to dismiss 147 university professors triggered a backlash from senior junta members who insisted on a swift return to multiparty politics. The resulting purge sent Türkeş and his allies into exile abroad.

The Purge and the Yassıada Executions

The junta's retribution extended far beyond the Democrat Party's leadership. More than two hundred and thirty-five generals and over three thousand commissioned officers were forced into retirement. Over five hundred judges and prosecutors were purged, and roughly fourteen hundred university faculty members lost their positions. The chief of the General Staff, the sitting president, the prime minister, and other senior administrators were placed under arrest. Several hundred Kurdish Alevi community leaders were detained in a camp at Sivas, while fifty-five individuals—many linked to the DP or serving as Kurdish members of parliament—were deported to western provinces. Interior Minister Namık Gedik took his own life while held at the Turkish Military Academy. The most consequential proceedings unfolded on Yassıada island in the Sea of Marmara, where a junta-appointed court tried President Celal Bayar, Prime Minister Menderes, and their colleagues on charges of high treason, financial misconduct, and constitutional violation. On 16 September 1961, Foreign Minister Zorlu and Finance Minister Polatkan were executed on İmralı island; Menderes followed the next day. Bayar was spared the rope but imprisoned on İmralı.

Constitutional Reset and the Military's Shadow

The coup's most durable institutional legacy was the 1961 constitution, approved by referendum on 9 July 1961 with 61.7 percent of the vote and an 81 percent turnout, replacing the 1924 framework. General elections followed on 15 October 1961, and civilian governance was formally restored. Yet the military's grip on Turkish politics did not loosen. The armed forces continued to dominate the political landscape until October 1965, during which period İsmet İnönü served as prime minister for the third time. Colonel Talat Aydemir attempted two further coups—in February 1962 and May 1963—both of which failed. When genuine competitive elections finally took place in 1965, Süleyman Demirel won and held office until 1971, when a military memorandum removed him. Paradoxically, the brief post-coup government fostered a political climate that catalyzed one of the most significant left-wing movements in Turkish history. Both the People's Liberation Party and the Patriotic Party still regard the 27 May event as a revolution rather than a mere coup.